Introduction
Nigeria gained independence on 1 October 1960. The three and a h alf decades which have elapsed since, represent a particularly troubled period o f intense political competition, military coup d'états, general instability o f government and a long, expensive and bitter civil war. During this period, the country ex perienced nine different governments, tw o civil and seven military ones, lasting on the average for a period o f less than four years (Ake, 1993:639) . All these events w ere accom panied by a deteriorating economical situation. At present, Nigeria is burdened with a debt o f m ore than 37 billion dollars and an inflation rate o f 70 percent (Anon., 1995a:36) .
This situation immediately raises the following questions: how could such a situation have been possible and what explanations could be provided for it? It is clear that the attainment o f formal political independence has not resulted in an aw areness o f national political unity in the country. The achievement o f peace and stability as well as political continuity still eludes Nigeria.
Successive Nigerian governments have then attem pted to harmonize state sovereignty (the exclusive authority governments exert in independent states) with national unity and awaken an aw areness within the Nigerian population. A purposive attempt has for instance been made to redress the lack o f unity in the country as part o f an ongoing process. One o f the results o f this attem pt has been that existing state boundaries have been maintained at all costs and that no secession o f any ethnic group has even been considered.
Indications are that the essence o f this problem is located in the concept o f the nation state which presupposes that the citizens o f states regard themselves as a unity with a communal loyalty towards the government and the geographical area that the state occupies. In many instances this is not the case, especially in Africa where the majority o f states are multi-ethnic in composition (Papp, 1988:19) . In such cases, the nation does not reflect the state in the practical sense -a phenomenon which creates a basis for political instability and incurs secession claims by specific ethnic groups in existing states (Liebenow, 1986:45) . In this way, the question o f national self-determination is constantly foregrounded in international politics. For the purposes o f this article self-determination is interpreted as a principle o f freedom for ethnic or religious groups constituting minorities in sovereign states (Cassese, 1993:823) .
In order to accommodate the geographical, ethnic, religious and political diversity in Nigeria and to try to accomplish national unity, the country instituted a federal political system from the very beginning. It is therefore the aim o f this article to consider to what extent the federation has been successful and what the practical circumstances and limitations relating to the Nigerian situation have been. The possibility o f some new factors which em erged during the last 36 years o f independence is also considered. First o f all, the focus will be placed on the above-mentioned population diversity and the attention will then shift to a brief perspective on the political history o f the Nigerian federation. The Christian view concerning authority and justice is also touched upon.
In conclusion, a reasonable assessment o f the defects o f and possible rem edies for this leading state in W est Africa is given.
The ethno-religious diversity of Nigeria
As far as its ethnic diversity and heterogeneity are concerned, Nigeria is a typical African state. The country's total population o f about 105 million people can be divided into about 250 ethnic groups (Ake, 1993:639) . The most important o f these groups are the Hausa and Fulani in the north, the Joruba in the w est and the Ibo in the east. These four groups represent about seventy-five percent o f the total population. O ther small ethnic groups are the Ijaw s in the Riverine Area, the Itshekiris, Urhobos, Efiks and Ibibios in the south (where elements o f the Ibo and Joruba also exist), the Igalas, Nupes, Idomas and Tivs in the M iddle Belt, and the Kanuris and Jukuns (together with the Hausa and the Fulani) in the north (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1995:315) .
M ore than two hundred languages are spoken, with Hausa, Joruba and Ibo as the main languages, while English serves as the official language. It is interesting to note that, in term s o f ethnic and language homogeneity, Nigeria ranked seventh on the world list in the late seventies with 13 percent on a scale, w hereas North and South K orea occupied the 135th place with 100 percent homogeneity and Tanzania in the first place with 7 percent (Kurian, 1978 (Kurian, :1083 .
In addition to the above-mentioned ethnic diversity, there is also evidence o f religious differences which tend to enforce and em phasize ethnic diversity. N igeria represents the most southern tip o f the Islamic sphere o f influence which w as predominant in North Africa from the 10th till the 19th century. The penetration o f this Islamic influence had, however, been stopped before it could reach the southern part o f the country. On the other hand, Christianity has becom e well established in southern Nigeria but has not been able to expand into the northern and w estern parts (Kurian, 1978 (Kurian, :1083 . Consequently, the religious com position o f the population is closely related to the geographical and ethnic lines o f distribution: the southern Ibo are predominantly Christian, while the northern Hausa are totally Muslim-oriented and the w estern Joruba are part Christian and part Muslim in composition.
A ccording to statistics o f 1987 about 45 percent o f all Nigerians w ere Muslim, 22 percent were Christians and the rest were followers o f animistic African religions (Graf, 1988:6) . It has already been proven on various occasions that these differences in religion have contributed to political and social unrest (Anon., 1984:236) . Furthermore, hardly any doubt could exist that the Biafran civil war (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) also contained undertones o f religious differences, but more specifically, it resulted from the differences between Christian-Ibos and Muslim Hausa/Fulani.
The impact o f the already mentioned ethnic and religious differences on the political life o f the Nigerian state was far reaching from the beginning and still represents one o f the single largest obstacles in the way o f political stability. There seems to be little doubt that, as far as Nigeria is concerned, ethnicity has retained its relevance as a mechanism o f analysis in the course o f time. Segal (1979:7) concludes that " ... although ethnicity is a far older basis o f organization than either the nation-state or systems o f rank based more on classes and less on status group, it does not lose its salience as these other forms developed around it" .
The birth of a federation in West Africa
As is known today, Nigeria w as conquered by the United Kingdom during the second half o f the nineteenth and the first decade o f the twentieth centuries. In 1914, North and South Nigeria were united by the British government and administered as one state. Despite the fact that a legislative council w as formed in 1922 to rule this area, the administration mostly remained in the hands o f traditional indigenous leaders but under the supervision o f the colonial authority (M cCaskie, 1995:693) . This indigenized style o f rule formed the basis o f the federal dispensation which w as later instituted. It is significant that this indirect system o f rule was reasonably successful in the north, but in the w est (among the Jorubas) and in the south east (among the Ibos) less success w as achieved. All indications are that indirect rule becam e unpopular among many educated Africans because o f its emphasis on preserving traditional culture, excluding them from administration and the native courts (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1995:318) .
Claude Ake (1993:639) points out that the British colonial policy o f indirect rule (especially during the first h alf o f the twentieth century) had been aimed at debilitating and upsetting the rise o f a nationalist movement in Nigeria and according to him, this policy later also contributed tow ards the regionalization o f the political elite as well as the politicising o f national and ethnic sectionalism. Due to the geographical and ethnic lines o f separation which characterized the Nigerian situation, and the tension and conflict which have em erged since the end o f the nineteenth century, the British government really had no other option but to introduce a federal government system which w as instituted in 1947. This government system included three areas, the Eastern, W estern and Northern Regions. "The federal arrangement w as an attempt to reconcile regional and religious tensions, and to accom modate the interests o f N igeria's diverse ethnic groups" (M cCaskie, 1995:693) .
In 1954 the federation was granted independent rule -an event which was followed by a series o f constitutional conferences in an attem pt to create a balance between regions and ethnic groups in the state. Very little success was achieved and it w as therefore not surprising that the three main political parties involved in N igeria's bid for independence were regionally bound and ethnically oriented: the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) represented the Hausa in the north, the Action Group (AG) was the Joruba's party in the w est and the National Council in Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCN C) w as the political party o f the Ibo in the east (Ake, 1993:639) . Within this party-political division, the under currents o f a pow er straggle based on ethnic divisions were present, and directly and detrimentally affected the dem ocratic political stability. In fact, today after 36 years o f independence, there are still no relevant political parties which could successfully enlist support on a national basis (Kwarteng, 1993:30-31 ).
The political situation immediately before N igeria's independence w as clearly based on kinship and ethnic groups, a fact which made the membership o f political parties exclusive and absolutised political differences. In such a situation politics equates a zero sum game which is played with passion. Nigeria has confirmed it.
It was not only the British government that believed Nigeria should become independent as a federal state, but all the most important Nigerian leaders o f the time were also convinced that " ... a federal structure w as the m ost viable form o f state and that a unitary model would not be successful in the Nigerian context" (M otala, 1992:8) . Together with the British authorities, they believed that attem pts at integrating the communities would only result in a fiasco and that a federal constitution would reduce mutual antagonism. From 1960 till 1967 (The First Republic) Nigeria w as a federation o f three regions, and after the creation of M id-W estem Nigeria, four regions (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1995:319) .
In the light o f this background, the political instability which followed the independence o f Nigeria was on the one hand not unexpected but on the other hand contrary to the expectations o f the federal optimists. The climax was reached in 1967 with the Biafran civil w ar that divided the world. The federal government w as supported by the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe, the OAU, the Arab states, the USA and Britain. On the other hand, Biafra received international recognition and support from France, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Zambia, the People's Republic o f China, Israel and South Africa (M arenin, 1993:79) . The events preceding the w ar and its duration clearly dem onstrate that, as a federal state, Nigeria was doomed to failure.
The Biafra tragedy
Within two years after independence, Nigeria was immersed in a political crisis. The reason w as the difference o f opinion that occurred after the national census held in 1962. The numbers mentioned in the census were a source o f conflict " ... because o f their potential effects on the balance o f pow er betw een the major nationalities" (Ake, 1993:639) . This problem was never solved. In fact, its results merely caused the national election o f 11 January 1965 to develop into a constitutional crisis with large-scale civil unrest. This crisis again directly gave rise to the first military coup d e la t executed mainly by Ibo officers in Nigeria on 19 January 1966. This event was shortly afterwards followed by another coup which, at that time, w as led by officers from the ranks o f the Hausa/Fulani in the north.
The large-scale murder and persecution o f Ibo inhabitants in the north caused 1,5 million o f these widely distributed Ibos to flee to the south east (Biafra) and they decided to fight in an organized way for the separation and independence o f Biafra (Ake, 1993:639) . When the civil w ar ended on 13 January 1970, between 600 000 and 1,5 million people had died and the economy o f the region had been destroyed.
In his commentary on the Biafran civil war, Marenin (1993:79) points out that the origin o f the attempts at separation could be ascribed to " . .. a political structure that fragmented pow er among regions each dominated by a m ajor ethnic group; traditional subnational fears and rivalries; an increasing differentiation o f political and economic pow er among groups, regions, and classes" . All indications were that the elements o f ethnicity and class had created a mutually-reinforcing effect (Marenin, 1993:79) .
Certainly, in the political history o f Nigeria, the Biafran civil w ar serves as the best example o f N igeria's failure as a federal state and its inability to establish political stability as a political system. The destruction o f Biafra and the Ibo w ere a clear warning and deterrent for other potential secessionists if they w ere to attempt something similar (Harden, 1993:288) . For succeeding governments and the political military elite o f Nigeria the prevention o f another Biafra has become a policy guiding principle ever since (Marenin, 1993:79) .
New attempts at nation building: The actions of military regimes
The immense tensions surrounding the Ibo issuw both before and after the Biafran civil w ar had, among others, caused the federal military leaders to extend the existing four federal regions to constitute twelve states on 28 M ay 1967. This step was specifically aimed at creating a more even-handed treatment for geographical regions and ethnic groups and to promote the influence o f the nonIbo residents in the eastern region (Anon., 1995b:647) . Ten years later, in April 1976, the number o f states were further increased to nineteen. This increase in the number o f states had been coupled with adaptations to the Nigerian constitution in order to directly address political conflict and instability. The constitution which was promulgated on 21 September 1978 had changed the Nigerian political system from a parliamentary to a presidential one with a considerable amount o f pow er concentration vested in the president o f the Federation (Ake, 1993:639).
The 1978 constitution laid the foundation for the Second Nigerian Republic (1979 Republic ( -1983 and within this framework, a series o f national elections w ere held in 1979 in which five parties participated. The result w as a civil dem ocratic dispensation that lasted till 1983 with President Shagari as federal president (Anon., 1995b:647) . Since that time, Nigeria has constantly been under military rule and all attem pts to re-establish a civil government have failed despite considerable international pressure.
It is particularly instructive that the number o f states in Nigeria were extended by another two under the rule o f President Babangida in September 1987 to amount to 21 (the Federal Capital area excluded) and in August 1991 to 30 states based on 'social justice, the principle o f development and the principle o f a balanced federation'" (Anon., I995b:649). The reasons which president Babangida proposed for the existence o f 30 states in the Federation are not questioned as such. It should be added that this large-scale fragmentation had also been aimed at geographically dividing the larger ethnic groups in order to w eaken them politically and to consolidate the position o f the smaller ethnic groups. By doing this the character o f ethnic conflicts has been redefined, rather than solved (Kwarteng, 1993:33) .
A survey o f the political instability o f the Second Nigerian Republic (1979 Republic ( -1983 as well as the subsequent period has indicated that the causes have acquired a multi-dimensional character and could not merely be ascribed to ethnic and cultural differences. During this period, instability could increasingly be related to a distrust o f the government's ability to rule effectively. The governm ent's excessive expenditure and massive official corruption and w aste w ere pointed out. The lessons learnt from the Biafran w ar w ere soon forgotten and the enormous income from oil, for example, was not used to benefit the whole country. Apart from this fact, the military regimes have become one o f N igeria's largest problem s as they do not seem to be able to abdicate their political power at the appropriate time. The present crisis surrounding President A bacha is a clear example o f how a military regime could prevent the reinstatement of democracy.
Since 1984 the military regimes have been "taken captive", have been influenced by all the contradictions o f Nigerian politics and infiltrated by ethnic, religious and regional conflict and factionalism (Ake, 1993:640) . Naturally, political stability would seem impossible in such circumstances.
Thus far in this article an attempt was made to highlight some o f the important politico-constitutional aspects in the history o f Nigeria. The logical conclusion that could be drawn would be that democracy and the federal political system have failed in Nigeria, that nation building has not produced the right results; that ethnicity still remains a very important divisive factor and that it is actually surprising that no spontaneous secession attempt has been made since 1970. The reasons for N igeria's failure as a state and the possibility o f the balkanisation o f the country into more states will be discussed in the following part o f the article.
The Nigerian federation -a reflection on the reasons for its failure
From its inception, Nigeria has been an artificially constructed state and the result o f colonial pow er enforcement in Africa. At no stage did the British government considered creating new states with homogeneous populations. The British indirect system o f rule acknowledged ethnicity, and in the process feelings o f nationalism were dam pened by directing loyalty to the local rulers and the colonial administration (Kwarteng, 1993:24) . Later on a federal political system was used in an attempt to reconcile and alleviate regional, ethnic and religious tensions and differences.
According to Smith (1987:108) , the federal system in Nigeria has only succeeded in exacerbating ethnic and other differences by expressing them in permanent territorial forms, something which, in turn, led towards the maintenance of regional domination and attempted separatism (Biafra). The increasing differen tiation between political and economic pow er between groups, areas and classes has spurred on conflict and corruption, and promoted elite competition. Against this background, it remains an open question whether the increase in the number o f states has in fact succeeded in ending the domination o f subunits by larger ethnic and religious groups.
The fact o f the m atter is that the Nigerian federal system has for a long time embodied specific ethno-cultural differences in the form o f territorial protection and that phenomenon has contributed to political instability and led to the repeated mobilization o f ethnic minorities. This situation contrasts sharply with a successful federation like the USA where the units (states) do not coincide with cleavages in the population (M otala, 1992:9) .
Another disturbing observation with regard to Nigerian politics is that since 1960 the negative influence o f ethno-religious diversity has increasingly coincided with a growing distrust within the broad ranks o f the population. The population increasingly distrusted the ability o f the government (civil or military) to rule effectively. A s has already been shown, this distrust is the result o f large-scale corruption and the squandering o f national resources by the political elite in power. These political leaders indeed proved themvelves as undisciplined and incapable o f giving decisive guidance. At the same time, how ever, they did exploit ethnic and regional differences in order to retain political pow er (Ake, 1993:640) .
It is indeed interesting and important to note that the phenomenon o f national self determination and secession is directly connected with the mentioned corruption and mismanagement by successive Nigerian governments. Odogu (1994:165) points out this fact by showing that the founding o f the Ethnic Minority Rights
Organization o f Africa (EM IROAF) w as more an expression o f the dissatisfaction flowing from the marginalization o f some o f the ethnic minority groups and the harm being done to them because o f corruption on a national level. (EM IROAF is an organization founded in Nigeria. This organization propagates the establish ment o f states based on ethnicity within a loose federal structure and with the specific option for separation if a specific group should so desire.)
Among the Nigerian political elite little or no support exists for the balkanization o f Nigeria into independent ethnic states. At present, practical considerations are playing a major role in regarding it as an unfavourable option. According to General O bassanjo, a former head o f state and president o f Nigeria, the interwovenness and complementarity o f the various aspects o f national life in N igeria make a breakup undesirable and almost impossible (Odogu, 1994:166 167) . Naturally, that does not mean that the federation cannot still break up. The idea that the federation is not likely to break up is reinforced by the political hold o f and the attachment to ethno-nationalism in the politics o f Nigeria and the inability o f the political leadership to produce sound and effective government.
A very important determining factor has appeared since 1989 -a factor which is already influencing Nigerian politics in a profound way -a dem ocratic movement with the specific objective to get rid o f Genl. Abacha and his military regime gained impetus. This movement also crossed all ethnic lines. It is against this background that one must start looking for possible solutions and options for Nigeria.
By way of conclusion -possible solutions and options for Nigeria
It seems clear that only tw o options exist for Nigeria at this stage, namely that politics must be de-militarized and that the country must becom e democratic enough to consider the interests o f all minority groups and the population at large. The long term solution lies in more responsive government regarding the needs o f the population as a whole. Corruption and personal enrichment among the political elite o f Nigeria -a phenomenon which is so extensive and widespread that the country's national interest is in jeopardy -must be brought to an end.
In order to accomplish these aims an even more fundamental issue must be addressed, namely the values needed for dem ocratic, responsible and responsive government. This fundamental issue also necessarily implies the implementing o f a just and accountable government o f which the political elite should be the leading proponents and supporters. If this ideal can be established as part o f a value system within the political leadership it might eventually filter through to the population in general.
In fact, the values that w ere referred to in this article represent an extraction from Christian ethics with regard to the state in general. According to the Christian view the state is established by God and those who rule must answ er to G od for the w ay they rule, whether the concerned government acknow ledges this fact or not. The ultimate cure for corruption and bad government is that every person who is involved in government is to fear God and not the people (Fowler, 1988:3) . In this sense the concepts o f dem ocracy and sound government are not the result o f pressure from the industrialized countries o f the world or the demands o f the general population but find their ultimate origin in a completely different source -the W ord o f God.
A Christian view also implies that a government receives its authority from God and should rule with justice. W hen a state applies its pow er simply to ensure its ruling position (as is the case with the present Nigerian military regime) it is abusing its pow er and acting beyond its God-given authority (Fowler, 1988:3) .
From a Christian point o f view a government (also the Nigerian government) is called to see that justice is done to all the sectors o f the country's population, that the national income is distributed equally and that smaller ethnic groups are not exploited by larger ethnic groups or by the federal government as such.
From a Christian perspective the link between dem ocratic and responsive government and possible future attem pts o f secession and self-determination in Nigeria among certain ethnic groups is also relevant in this context. History has clearly shown that the most important and effective measure for preventing secession claims by ethnic groups in plural states is governments which are responsive to and sympathetic towards the particular cultural and socio-econom ic needs o f such groups under its authority. If this principle could be clearly understood by states w orldwide a point can be reached where the general problematic o f ethnically-divided states would be handled in a politically more satisfactory way. However, it must be remembered that each practical situation is unique and dem ands unique approaches and management. The principle o f responsiveness, however, will always remain relevant in successfully governing multi-cultural societies.
It must, however, be conceded that in some cases the creation o f independent ethnic states (in a peaceful manner) could provide the possible means by which the problem o f plural states could also be approached. It seems as if the spirit o f the times and the nature o f the present international system could make this option more possible than it would have been during the Cold W ar period. 
